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If one wants to have peace in the Middle East, one will have to persuade 
all of the actors to sit around a table and to talk about all of the conflicts. 
Secret negotiations are just as ineffectual as the exclusion of certain ac-
tors. Only a common platform for dialogue will enable the European Un-
ion and above all the U.S. to fulfil their peacemaking mission. 
 
 
I 
The Hamas-Israeli War 
The war against Hamas has strengthened 
Israel directly in military terms, but has 
completely ruined its reputation in the 
Arab and Muslim world. The danger of 
Hamas rocket attacks may have been ter-
minated for the time being, but in regional 
terms Israel’s security situation has not 
got any better. 
 
Can anyone still provide security in the 
Gaza Strip? The Palestinians are divided 
and without a legitimate leadership, and 
the situation seems hopeless and desolate 
in Gaza. The Annapolis negotiations be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians have not 
yet led to a two-state solution. The strat-
egy which involves strengthening Fatah on 
the West Bank and isolating Hamas in the 
Gaza Strip has not worked. The political 
elites continue to fight shy of an open and 
honest dialogue with their citizens. Al-
though they are fully aware of the basic 
facts of a solution to the conflict between 
Israel and Palestine, they continue to steer 
clear of spelling out the compromises that 
will have to be made. 
 
Trust in others has reached its nadir. Each 
side has its own media and perceptions. 
The Arabs watch Al Jazeera, the Israelis 
watch Channel 2, the Americans watch 
Fox News, and the Europeans watch the 
BBC. The conflict has generated a great 
deal of emotional turmoil, as the world-
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wide pro-Israeli and pro-Palastinian dem-
onstrations have shown. Apart from dem-
onstrations in European capitals, hundreds 
of people took to the streets in German 
provincial towns, too. This poisons the 
whole atmosphere, and more and more 
people are prompted to espouse radical 
views. The moderate forces and govern-
ments are being weakened and the pros-
pects of an Israeli-Palestinian two-state so-
lution is becoming increasingly improb-
able. 
 
In the Hamas-Israeli conflict in particular 
the European Union is once again being 
called upon to bear the burden of conflict 
management. This was already the case in 
the summer of 2006 in southern Lebanon, 
when the war between Israel and Hizbol-
lah ended only after the deployment of the 
UNIFIL II mission. Yet this conflict dem-
onstrates that the end of a war does not 
signify peace by any stretch of the imagi-
nation. The international missions moni-
toring the ceasefire will only turn out to be 
a success once peace treaties between Is-
rael, the Palestinians and their Arab 
neighbours have been concluded. 
 
II 
Everything is  
Interconnected 
The convoluted state of affairs continues to 
worsen because all of the actors in the 
Middle East taken as a whole have their 
fingers in the pie somewhere, either with 
regard to the use of force or to attempts at 
peace-making, as some examples con-
nected with the most recent Hamas-Israeli 
war demonstrate: 
 
•  Syria is allowing exiled Hamas leader 
Mashaal to act more freely in order to 
show Israel and the U.S. that Syria wishes 
to have a say in matters relating to war 
and peace. 
 
•  The hardliners in Iran are relieved yet 
again that international attention has now 
shifted to Israel and Gaza and away from 
their nuclear programme. 
 
•  Israel is attacking Hamas alos in order 
to deter Hizbollah on its northern border. 
 
•  Egypt has sealed off Hamas within the 
Gaza Strip in order to prevent it from co-
operating with the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
 
•  Iran and Syria are using their influence 
on Hamas in order to strike the U.S. via 
Israel, in other words, to demonstrate that 
they can harm American interests in the 
region, but that they can also promote 
them. 
“Regional Powers are 
playing the game  
indirectly.” 
In these manoeuvres the regional powers 
are playing the game indirectly. Whilst 
demonstrating to each other how poten-
tially disruptive they can be, they are not 
giving anyone a reason to attack them. 
 
This method is also used in order to delay 
or even to torpedo bilateral attempts to re-
solve conflicts. 
 
•  Turkish attempts to bring about a rap-
prochement between Israel and Syria has 
mobilised Lebanese and Palestinians, 
since they fear that such an agreement 
will be at their expense. 
 
•  Mere rumours that Washington is trying 
to reach a bilateral agreement with Tehran 
has Saudis, Emiratis, Israelis and Iraqis up 
in arms. They are afraid that an American-
Iranian treaty might fail to take into ac-
count their own security interests. 
 
•  Israel is in favour of peace with Syria 
primarily in order to isolate Iran, and con-
strues the stand-offs with Hamas and Hiz-
bollah as proxy wars with Iran. 
 
•  Pictures of the unabated construction of 
settlements in East-Jerusalem or on the  
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West Bank make it increasingly difficult 
even for moderate Arab leaders in the Gulf 
to ask their countries to support the Arab 
peace initiative with Israel. 
 
The attempts to ignore, neutralize or iso-
late spoilsports and obstructionists have 
come to grief as a result of regional entan-
glements. 
 
•  The Israeli government’s plan to negoti-
ate a two-state solution with Fatah has 
ground to a halt also because it 
has been impossible to isolate 
Hamas, who are in control of 
Gaza. 
 
•  The Lebanese Hizbollah 
emerged strengthened from the 
asymmetrical war against the 
Israeli Army in the summer of 
2006. It was able to exercise its 
veto in the context of intra-
Lebanese wrangling and, by 
pointing to the ongoing conflict 
with Israel, to stop attempts to 
disarm it. In this regard Iran and 
Syria have displayed the extent 
of their influence. A Syrian-
Saudi quarrel paralyzed an intra-
Lebanese agreement for months. 
 
T
tors such as Hamas and Hizbol-
lah are in fact tools of the com-
peting regional powers in the 
Middle East. And to make every-
thing even more complicated, 
moderate politicians and radical 
leaders are jostling for power 
even within movements such as 
Hamas and Hizbollah. 
 
T
Middle East specialist Robert 
Baer sums up the situation thus. 
“Hizbollah, Hamas and the Shiite 
parties in Iraq look to Tehran for 
financial aid and support. As 
long as the U.S. does not solve 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Iran’s influence will grow.” 
 
T
the attempt to isolate the re-
gional powers Syria and Iran has been a 
failure. Furthermore, bids to conclude bi-
lateral agreements have come to grief on 
account of the veto powers of neighbour-
ing states. Conflict management as in the 
case of Israel-Gaza and Israel-South Leba-
non may be of importance in order to  
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bring armed conflicts to an end, yet con-
flict management per se simply increases 
the potential for further wars. The next 
step in the dispute relating to the Iranian 
nuclear programme is already discernible 
on the horizon.  
 
A
is becoming more expensive. The interna-
tional community is having to come up 
with more and more diplomatic, financial 
and human resources to support a UN 
mandate, whilst at the same time endan-
gering the lives of its aid workers and blue 
helmets. And the missions come to an end 
only when it is possible to make peace. 
For example, the UNIFIL II mission in 
southern Lebanon, which since the sum-
mer of 2006 has been run primarily by 
European blue helmets, will turn out to be 
a success only after Israel has signed 
peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon. 
 
E
his interests and anxieties will be passed 
over or ignored. Each actor wishes to be 
esteemed, accepted and taken seriously by 
his neighbours and the USA. Each actor 
would like to show how important he is in 
the region and that it is worth supporting 
him in political and economic terms. Each 
actor is striving for security and prosper-
ity. 
 
P
balancing interests. Yet in the Middle East 
emotions, symbols, vivid ideas and neu-
rotic images also play an important role. 
Future conflict management and conflict 
resolution need to pay more attention to 
such perceptions. 
 
III 
A Common Platform for 
Future diplomatic ef be di-
 is not about pageantry, showmanship, 
“Avoid as much diplomatic 
The method
 contrast to this the goal of this quest is 
Dialogue 
forts should 
rected primarily at providing a common 
platform for all of the actors and thus for 
all of their interests, fears and cleavages. 
However, this common platform will not 
simply be part of a never-ending series of 
Middle East intergovernmental confer-
ences and not another summit held for its 
own sake. No actor will be excluded, all 
interests will have a voice, every conflict 
will be taken seriously and everyone will 
have the same opportunity to explain his 
anxieties and fears about the future. It will 
all be about honesty, openness, modesty 
and a new language of reconciliation.  
 
It
big promises or bitter accusations. This is 
not a naive or cosy strategy, and is also all 
about sending out a symbolic signal: There 
will be no more secret negotiations of the 
kind which give rise to nothing but suspi-
cion and opposition. Secretiveness spawns 
rumours and conspiracy theories, and in 
the Middle East this always means that 
everything has already come to grief be-
fore it has even got off the ground. The 
search for peace in the Middle East needs 
to escape from this vicious circle. 
wrangling as possible.” 
ology of this new approach is 
based on the idea of inviting all parties to 
share a common platform on which they 
can search for ways for a common and 
sustainable resolution of their various 
interlinked conflicts. The goal of this quest 
is not as in the past conflict management 
as such. Many actors in the region reject 
the kind of conflict management strategy 
pursued in recent years, which they be-
lieve is nothing more than muddling 
through and procrastination, and has been 
unable to reduce the potential for new 
outbursts of violence.  
 
In
nothing less than conflict resolution, 
though in all modesty on two levels of at-
tainment: The first level, which takes its 
bearings from the notion of conflict trans-
formation, is a stage in which the dialogue 
platform becomes the forum within which 
potential conflicts can be nudged into  
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peaceful channels. The second level pre-
supposes that a serious effort will be made 
by all of the participants to terminate as 
many conflicts as possible with the help of 
peace treaties. Thus the platform could 
move on from being a dialogue forum to 
become a negotiating forum. 
 
O
table, they will have become an integral 
part of the process. No one will be able to 
claim that he was not invited or that he 
was not listened to, and that he thus has 
every right to opt out 
of the process and to 
make trouble for eve-
ryone else. Anyone 
who turns down an in-
vitation is telling the 
rest of the world that 
he is trying to hold 
things up. He can no 
longer hide behind the 
claim that an external 
force, as was the case 
with the Bush admini-
stration, has done all it 
can to isolate him (as 
in the case of Iran) or 
is actually dead set 
against having him 
there at all (as in the 
case of Syria). 
 
A
invited on the basis of 
equality. The envoy 
system will be used in 
order to avoid as much 
diplomatic wrangling 
as possible about 
status questions before 
the platform convenes. 
Every head of state 
and government will 
choose an envoy. The Palestinians (in 
point of fact without a 
ship since 9 January) will decide them-
selves, without pressure from outside, who 
is to represent them at the talks. If it is 
one person from Gaza and one person from 
the West Bank, then that may initially be 
possible, though in the course of time they 
will also have to reach agreement on a 
special envoy. The platform will be exert-
ing pressure on them to attain a consen-
sus. As a multilateral external actor the 
European Union should agree on one 
voice, which might well be that of the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, Javier Solana. 
 
T
or, and this would be even better, on a 
permanent basis, so that invitations to the 
deal of diplomatic effort. The envoy solu-
tion will make it easier to agree on dates 
and on an agenda. All the various conflicts 
will be on the agenda. The discussions will 
then consider all of the more or less in-
terwoven lines of conflict: Israel-Palestine, 
next gathering will not involve a great  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
f
t
e
r
 
G
a
z
a
:
 
A
 
D
i
a
l
o
g
u
e
 
P
l
a
t
f
o
r
m
 
 
 
 
P
a
g
e
 
6
 
ll the fundamental issues on which these 
he comprehensive approach of a common 
he symbolism of the venue is of some 
he greatest responsibility devolves on the 
#
 
2
0
0
9
/
0
2
 
Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon, Arab World-
Israel, Lebanon-Syria, Iraq-Iran-Turkey-
Syria, Gulf States-Iran, Iran-Israel, and 
Iraq and its neighbours. The most impor-
tant thing is to attempt to create as much 
consensus as possible and to balance the 
various interests in an equitable manner. 
And if progress is made in the discussions 
and negotiations on the Israeli-Syrian 
agenda item, for example, it will have a 
positive influence on the other conflicts. 
 
A
conflicts are based, such Israel’s right to 
exist as a Jewish state, the Palestinians’ 
and the Kurds’ right to self-determination, 
the territorial integrity of Iraq, the inde-
pendence of Lebanon and Syria, Iran’s se-
curity interests, or the stability and secu-
rity of the Arab Gulf states will be taken 
into account. 
 
T
platform for dialogue will give the Arab 
world the assurance that all the conten-
tious points relating to Israel will be dealt 
with, as will Israel’s concerns about its re-
gional security and full incorporation into 
the region. Iran will be able to make out a 
case for its wish to be an integral part of 
the region. The U.S. will perceive that the 
withdrawal of its troops from Iraq is safe 
in the regional context. And the smaller 
countries of the region will also have their 
say. 
 
T
importance. For this reason the common 
forum for dialogue will not be meeting in 
places which remind people of previous 
Middle East initiatives such as Oslo, Ma-
drid, Annapolis, Camp David or Shep-
herdstown. Nor will the participants be 
meeting in places which are associated 
with important historical agreements such 
as San Francisco, Rome or Seville (how-
ever pleasant it might be, though not all of 
the actors may be of this opinion). The 
common forum for dialogue is supposed to 
stand for a new beginning of a modest, in-
clusive and goal-oriented kind, and for this 
reason as many associations as possible 
should be avoided. It must be a practical 
working location for the envoys. The best 
thing would be somewhere in the Middle 
East, partly in order to emphasize the con-
nection with the region, and the commit-
ment of the actors who actually live there. 
 
T
host as discussion leader. What is needed 
is a powerful and very tactful personality. 
Even if many actors believe that the U.S. 
has lost its reputation as an honest broker, 
it continues to be the most powerful ex-
ternal actor. It has a sizeable number of 
armed forces in the region, a plethora of 
interests, and the greatest ability to issue 
certain guarantees. For almost everyone in 
the region the new American president 
stands for hope and a new beginning. His 
envoy should also embody this positive 
kind of authority. The reason for this is 
that the American envoy will bear the 
principal responsibility for the atmosphere 
of the talks. He must avoid that the multi-
lateral talks will fall apart into bilateral 
and (semi-)secret negotiations. And last 
but not least he will also have to incorpo-
rate the other external actors (EU, UN, 
Russia, China, and Japan) on an equal foot-
ing. 
 
IV 
No time to lose 
The inaugu sident  ration of the new U.S. pre
would seem to be a good moment to start 
with the initiative. Barack Obama himself 
has announced that he will quickly be-
come involved in the Middle East conflict. 
Thus it seems that on this occasion presi-
dential participation, in contrast to 
Obama’s predecessors Clinton and Bush, 
can already be expected at the beginning 
of a term of office and not at the end. That 
would strengthen the authority and the 
commitment of U.S. involvement. At the 
same time Obama will encounter a great 
willingness on the part of the Europeans 
and many regional actors to work together 
closely. 
  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
f
t
e
r
 
G
a
z
a
:
 
A
 
D
i
a
l
o
g
u
e
 
P
l
a
t
f
o
r
m
 
 
 
 
P
a
g
e
 
7
 
 recent months Obama’s advisers have 
he difficult and unpredictable challenges 
#
 
2
0
0
9
/
0
2
 
In
let it be known that they will be suggest-
ing to the new U.S. administration that 
there should be multilateral involvement, 
close cooperation and burden-sharing with 
the EU, and a dialogue between Washing-
ton, Damascus and Tehran. Furthermore, 
Israel is electing a new parliament in Feb-
ruary and thus a new government, and 
Iran is electing a new president in June. 
And the Palestinians are being pressured 
to determine a new legitimate leadership. 
These are the points which suggest that 
2009 may well be a year of opportunity in 
which it would make sense to embark on a 
new approach to conflict resolution in the 
Middle East. 
 
T
posed by the global economic and financial 
crisis still constitute a risk. Thus the 
Obama administration might well have to 
deal with growing intra-American prob-
lems, and this may leave little time for 
foreign policy initiatives. Similarly, new 
incidents in the Middle East may lead to 
crises or wars at a moment’s notice, and 
this would terminate an ongoing dialogue 
or defer it indefinitely. 
 
V 
What is the EU doing? 
The European Union possesses a we
  The EU can impress upon the new U.S. 
“The isolation of Syria and 
•  The EU has resilient re  
  The EU is the largest financial donor to 
  Europe needs peace projects in its 
espite this important potential, the Euro-
alth of 
experience and skills with which it can 
help to implement a new Middle East ap-
proach on the basis of a common platform 
for dialogue. 
 
•
administration that the inclusive approach 
is better than to act bilaterally and to iso-
late important players; that Obama must 
move on the Middle East at the beginning 
of his presidency and not towards the end; 
that the strategy should be conflict resolu-
tion and not procrastinatory conflict man-
agement; that a new negotiating approach 
must be adopted and that all this taken to-
gether can dramatically improve the image 
of the U.S. in the region, and in the final 
analysis can even create better regional 
conditions for a withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from Iraq. 
Iran has failed.” 
lations with all of
the actors in the region, and for this rea-
son it can underline the importance of 
American envoy invitations to states such 
as Iran and Syria that have hitherto been 
isolated from the USA. 
 
•
the Palestinian administration. It is in-
volved in police training (EUPOL COPPS) 
and in customs clearance at Rafah cross-
ing between Gaza and Egypt (EU BAM). 
 
•
southern neighbourhood so that the Medi-
terranean Union can get off the ground 
and that at long last the great social and 
economic challenges in North Africa and 
the Middle East can move to the centre of 
the policymaking stage. 
 
D
pean Union should not adopt a competitive 
stance towards the USA. In fact the EU 
should realize that a solution of the con-
flict will only be possible if there is a new 
and stronger role for the U.S., which in its 
turn is placing its hopes in a resilient 
Transatlantic partnership. 
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